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TRUTH AND FICTION IN THE JUDICIAL
HANDLING OF STATUTES
Jerry J. Phillips*
About the time I first met Pablo, he had made a sculpture of
a bull's head out of the seat and handlebars of a bicycle. He

used to say that this sculpture was reversible. "I find a bicycle
seat and handlebars in the street, and I say, 'Well, there's a bull,' "
he explained to me. "Everybody who looks at it after I assemble
it says 'Well, there's a bull,' until a cyclist comes along and says,

'Well, there's a bicycle seat,' and he makes a seat and a pair
of handlebars out of it again. And that can go on, back and

forth, for an eternity, according to the needs of the mind and
the body."**

But this rough magic
I here abjure, and, when I have requir'd
Some heavenly music, which even now I do,

To work Mine end upon their senses that
This airy charm is for, I'll break my staff,

Bury it certain fathoms in the earth,
And deeper than did ever plummet sound
I'll drown my book.***
THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

It is marvel enough that the Marshall Court in Marbury v. Madison'
found the power of constitutional review of state and federal statutes to
lie with the courts. However, to read the courts' attempts to define what
is a constitutional issue is truly astounding.
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

* W.P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. The author is deeply indebted to Professor Paul R. Baier, of Louisiana State University Law Center, for his invaluable suggestions and encouragement in connection with this article.
**

F. GILOT & C. LUKE, LIFE WITH PICASSO 321 (1964).
W. SHAKESPEARE, Ti TEMPEST act V, scene I.

1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Even the jurisdictional aspect of the case is bemusing. Why did the Court not simply hold that it lacked original jurisdiction because no ambassador, public minister, consul or state was a party to the lawsuit? See U.S. CoNST. art.
111, § 2; Ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302 (1925). Alternatively, using the well-accepted rule
of statutory construction to avoid a constitutional issue when reasonably possible, the Marshall Court could easily have construed section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as conferring mandamus power on the Court only for appellate jurisdictional purposes. Indeed, why
does the Court not have mandamus power in its original jurisdiction? Cf. Ex parte Republic
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). Having worked through this maze of issues, one can then
get to the sixty-four dollar question of where in the Constitution, and why, is the power
of constitutional review conferred on the courts.
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On the one hand, there is the textually applicable provision, such as
the fifth amendment, where the justices often strongly differ regarding
the applicability of the provision to the facts at hand. 2 These cases are
legion, and they exert a constant pressure on the courts to establish a
generalized rule that will facilitate disposition on something other than
an ad hoc basis. Thus, in the area of the fifth amendment one sees the
emergence of the fixed rule of Miranda v. Arizona3 to determine voluntariness of confession. Under the first amendment, the court attempted
to move away from the amorphous public-interest standard of Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc.4 in libel suits to the more fixed public-private person
categories of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.5
There is, however, substantial pressure to reconvert these fixed rules
into ad hoc determinations. So the issue under Miranda shifts from voluntariness of confession to voluntariness of waiver; under Gertz, the focus
shifts from determining public interest 6 to determining the public versus
private status of the plaintiff and whether fault or constitutional malice
has been shown. These reconverted issues are factual and are determined
on a case-by-case, judgmental basis, and not by a broad, mechanically
applicable rule.
On the other hand are cases where the constitutional power authorizing or prohibiting state action is nowhere evident on the face of the constitution. Thus, the Marshall Court found the power of Congress to
establish federal banks that are not subject to state taxation to be implicit in the constitution'-an early "penumbras" case. The Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut8 found the constitutional right of a married couple to obtain birth control information and devices to be implicit variously
in the penumbras of the first eight amendments to the constitution, in
the ninth amendment, and in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The dissenters, while conceding the Connecticut statute at
issue to be "an uncommonly silly law" and "unwise, or even asinine," 9
nevertheless found it to be constitutional.

2. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). Of course, the distinction between
law and fact is not always easy to make. See Wainwright v. Goode, 104 S. Ct. 378 (1983)
(the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the relevance of an aggravating factor in a capital
case viewed alternatively as a determination of fact and of law).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. Indeed, the issue of public interest appears to have been retained as an additional
factor to be considered, instead of being discarded in exchange for other criteria. See Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. Id.at 527.
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It always makes students of the law uncomfortable to see constitu-

tional issues pulled out of penumbras, much like a rabbit being pulled
out of a magician's hat. Conversely, it is equally discomforting to see
distinguished justices state with a straight face" that while a law may
be "unwise,"

"uncommonly silly" and "even asinine," it is nevertheless

constitutional. The suggestion implicit in such a statement-that constitutional adjudication is not based on policy considerations' '-is disingenuous
at best.
Astonishment does not end here, however. There are also the three
levels of constitutional review-the rational basis, the substantial basis,
and the compelling state interest.' If reviewed under the first standard,
a law is almost certain to pass constitutional muster; if reviewed under
the third, it is almost certain to fail. Under the second standard, the outcome is anybody's guess. A determination of which standard applies in

a given case is of paramount importance, but no clear criteria are apparent. To say that the third standard involves fundamental rights and
suspect classifications, for example, provides little help,' 3 since presumably
all constitutional rights are fundamental, and most laws that are doubtfully constitutional raise equal protection issues of suspect classifications.
A new brand of equal protection and due process adjudication that
smacks of the allegedly discredited Lochnerism also exists."' This adjudication is particularly evident at the state level; it often-and apparently
permissibly' 5-goes beyond the reach of federal constitutional strictures,
making many constitutional scholars exceedingly uncomfortable. If guest
passenger statutes are unconstitutional, as they have been held to
be' 6-although by no means uniformly"-at the state level," then what
10. The late Fleming James used to say that a plausible legal argument is any argument that a lawyer can make with a straight face. Professor James was an uncommonly
honest man, however, and one would be understandably reluctant to use this standard for
judging the plausibility of legal arguments made by poker-faced lawyers.
11. Professor Calabresi describes a court's common-law lawmaking function as that
of determining consistent "policies," and constitutional adjudication as that of determining
"principles." G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 165 (1982). "Principles are what is viewed as right; policies, what is useful." Id. at 292-93 n.l. This distinction, although nice in theory, is not very easy to make in practice with any significant
degree of consistency, and it has a will-o'-the-wisp ring of fiction about it.
12. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972); Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions: The Case for
Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241, 249, 251, 264 (1981).
13. Gunther, supra note 12, at 8.
14. Kirby, supra note 12, at 247.
15. Id. at 251.
16. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
17. See Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974), and cases discussed therein.
18. The United States Supreme Court upheld the Connecticut guest-passenger statute
against federal constitutional attack in Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
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statutes are constitutional? 9 Products liability and medical malpractice
statutes of repose have likewise been struck down as unconstitutional, and
again with sharply divided views as to the legitimacy of such holdings."
Dollar limitations on the amount of tort recovery have met the same fate."
Why have statutes of fraud not been similarly struck down? Is it not

arbitrary that some contracts must be in writing, while others need not
be? Why must a contract for the sale of goods of $500 or more be in
writing to be enforceable, while a sale for $499 need not?" Why must
a contract to be performed in a year and a day be in writing, but not

one to be performed within a year? 23 Why is the hearsay rule constitutional, since some hearsay which is admitted as an exception to the rule
is surely as unreliable as other hearsay which is excluded?' 4 The list of
unconstitutional laws under this kind of analysis is potentially limitless.
The concept of inherent court power is yet another category of con-

stitutional adjudication which, to date, has had a rather limited application, but which could well be expanded to gargantuan proportions. So
far it has been used, apparently exclusively at the state level, to determine the constitutionality of statutes regulating the practice of law.25 The

cases involve such matters as the qualifications for practicing law and
grounds for lawyer discipline. But why is this power limited to attorney
qualification cases? Why does not any law affect the qualification-or,

by slight extension, the quality-of practice before the courts?
19. The decisions finding guest-passenger statutes unconstitutional under state constitutional provisions have been severely criticized. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 206 (7th ed. 1982). "The true antimajoritarian role that
our tradition of judicial review does assign to courts is too crucial and too chaste to permit
its promiscuous application in circumstances that are trivial, as in guest statutes." G.
CALABREsI,

supra note 11, at 164.

20. See Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980"s: "Repose is Not the Destiny" of
Manufacturers, 61 N.C.L REv. 33 (1982); Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FoRDtAm L. REv. 745 (1982); Stewart, Constitutionalityof Remedial Legislation
in the Field of Professional Liability, 18 FOR THE DEFENSE 73 (1977); Medical Malpractice
Act: Statutory Limit on Damagesfor Noneconomic Losses Held Unconstitutional, 22 ATLAL
Rep. 39 (1979).
21. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp., 63 111. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Arneson
v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
22. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978).
23. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-2-101(5) (1983).
24. The confrontation clause normally requires a showing of unavailability of the
declarant and a showing that the declarant's statement "bears adequate 'indicia of reliabil-

ity.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Presumably the states, under their own constitutions, see Kirby, supra
note 12, at 251, could go further and exclude all hearsay because of allegedly arbitrary
classifications between "firmly rooted" and not so firmly rooted exceptions.
25. See, e.g., Cantor v. Brading, 494 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
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Sorrells v. United States26 is a very interesting Supreme Court case
dealing with the entrapment defense. Some of the justices sought to apply
the defense based on the inherent power of the Court, while others would
have applied the defense based on the supposed intent of Congress in
connection with the national prohibition statute at issue. A fascinating
aspect of the case is that the "inherent power" justices based their decision to apply the defense on nonconstitutional grounds.27 They implicitly
recognized, in other words, that if Congress were clear enough, the defense
could constitutionally be made inapplicable to the statute at hand. This
holding adumbrates the nonconstitutional, noninterpretational approach
to the invalidity of statutes discussed in the latter part of this article28
as an alternative to the uncertain and highly potent constitutional analysis
of laws.
Why is there much uncertainty about when an issue is properly raised
regarding the constitutional validity of a statute? The explanation apparently is that there is no agreement on what a constitutional issue is. To say
that a constitutional issue implicates fundamental values does no good
because one person's fundamentalism is another person's trivia.29 Thus,
school prayer has been held to be a fundamental issue, 30 but the United
States Supreme Court has held the issue of the opening of the Nebraska
legislative sessions with prayer not to be of sufficieht magnitude to rise
to the level of constitutional importance. 3 At one time, commercial speech
was not protected by the first amendment because fundamental values
were apparently not involved, 32 but now such speech is at least partially
protected. 3 Whenever the interests of a lawyer's client are at stake,
however, those interests are fundamental to that lawyer and that client.
It is more realistic to recognize that the importance or seriousness
of an issue is not absolute, but varies with time and circumstances. The
eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment issue, for example, is
heating up and becoming much more important than ever. This rising

26. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
27. Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., dissenting in part); G. CAiABREsI, supra note 11, at 287 n.33.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 11-19.
30. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
31. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3349 (1983) ("Simply put, the Court seems
to regard legislative prayer as at most a de minimis violation, somehow unworthy of our
attention." (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
32. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
33. 'Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976). But see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977) (refusing
to apply the constitutional doctrine of overbreadth to commercial speech since "presumably"
the advertiser of products or services "can determine more readily than others whether his
speech is truthful and protected.").
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controversy is due to the continued concern over the legitimacy of capital
punishment and even of appropriate noncapital punishment.3 '
Moreover, questions of constitutionality run on a spectrum. 5 A law
is not necessarily either all constitutional or all unconstitutional; it may
be slightly or substantially unconstitutional, or anywhere in between. A
law providing separate public restrooms for men and women is probably
completely constitutional; a law providing segregated restrooms based on
race is probably completely unconstitutional. Gray areas fall in between.
What about separate restrooms for faculty and students in a law school?
Could separate restrooms for athletes and nonathletes be constitutionally
justified? What of separate restrooms for homosexuals, heterosexuals,
hermaphrodites, and transsexuals?36 Once again, the list of possibly unconstitutional categories seems potentially limitless. A major problem with
constitutional adjudication is its all-or-nothing impact on laws. Except
for the so-called "passive virtues," discussed in the next section, courts
typically do not say, "This statute is a little unconstitutional," or, "This
statute is almost completely unconstitutional." Instead, they usually say
it either is, or is not, constitutional.
In some instances a declaration of unconstitutionality is not fatal to
a law's reenactment. 37 Probably more often, however, a declaration of
constitutional infirmity dooms a statute for reenactment purposes. A constitutional declaration against prayer in schools, unless overruled by the
Supreme Court or by constitutional amendment, is inflexible. In those
instances where laws are only partially unconstitutional, such inflexibility
is very strong medicine indeed. Moreover, the difficulty of deciding when
34. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (capital punishment for rape violates
the eighth amendment); Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) (capital punishment
for felony murder violates the eighth amendment); Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983)
(life sentence without possibility of parole for conviction of passing $100 bad check and.
for six prior nonviolent convictions violates the eighth amendment). Professor John Kaplan
perceptively interprets recent Supreme Court decisions as likely establishing the constitutional proposition that any and all evidence is probably relevant and admissible on behalf
of the defendant by way of mitigation on the issue of punishment in a capital case. Kaplan,
Evidence in Capital Cases, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV, 369 (1983).
35. As Professor Calabresi puts it, some laws "might be moving toward unconstitutionality," or might be "semiconstitutional," and yet not be completely invalid. G. CaLBREsl,
supra note 11, at 16, 21.
36. In Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.; 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983),
the defendant newspaper, following up "several confidential sources," discovered that the
plaintiff, Toni Ann Diaz-a controversial student class president of a California community
college-was in fact a transsexual who had been born in Puerto Rico as Antonio Diaz,
a male. A reporter for the newspaper published a short gossip item in the paper revealing
this discovery, and concluded with the quip: "Now I realize, that in these times such a
matter is no big deal, but I suspect his female classmates in P.E. 97 may wish to make
other showering arrangements." 139 Cal. App. 3d at 124, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 766. The California Court of Appeal held the plaintiff stated a cause of action against the defendant for
invasion of privacy.
37. See infra text accompanying note 38.
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constitutional adjudication should be applied, and under what standard,
further complicates the use of this method of review. These problems have
led courts to seek less severe, and perhaps less complex, measures of adjudication when the issue of constitutionality vel non is uncertain. The
measures involve the so-called passive virtues, and interpretation.
THE NoNCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

Passive Virtues
Alexander Bickel coined the felicitous phrase "passive virtues" 38 to
describe those numerous maneuvers the courts use to skirt constitutional
issues, thus giving the majoritarian processes a second chance to work
out the problem short of constitutional adjudication. The plaintiff may
lack standing; the issue may be moot, or not ripe for adjudication; there
may be no case or controversy, or the lawsuit may involve a nonjusticiable
political question; the case may be determinable on independent state
grounds; or certiorari may have been improvidently granted. A law that
is capable of more than one construction should be construed in a manner which will uphold its constitutionality. Anyone who has studied federal
procedure in any depth is familiar with the numerous and often distractingly elusive devices which the courts, particularly the United States
Supreme Court, use to avoid adjudication on the constitutional merits.
Even when the Court addresses the constitutional issue on the merits,
it often does so in a way that does not spell the constitutional death knell
for the law in issue. A statute found unconstitutionally vague, for example, can be legitimated by legislative tightening; an unconstitutional delegation of powers can be lawfully reasserted by its rightful owner; or an
unconstitutional state infringement on interstate commerce can be validated
by express Congressional approbation. All of these instances represent attempts by the courts to sidestep the constitutional issue because constitutional adjudication is such strong medicine. Perhaps in the process the
court will drop a dictum or two indicating its concern with the hovering
constitutional or quasi-constitutional problem. A word to the wise is well
taken.
Interpretation
The major nonconstitutional method used by courts from time immemorial to invalidate or emasculate distasteful laws is that of interpretation. Interpretation may be used to "reconstruct" common law precedent
or statutes. The end result in either case is the same: the old law takes
on a new look so that one would hardly know the two are the same,
while in theory, if not in fact, the old law remains intact.
Why do courts engage in such subterfuge? Initially, one should note
38.

A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS

BRANCH 111 (1962).
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that the technique of interpretation is not always a subterfuge. Interpretation of statutes to determine the true legislative intent is a legitimate judicial
function. In a civil law jurisdiction such as Louisiana, interpretation of
legislative intent has been honed to a fine art." Even in common law
jurisdictions, the deft civil law approach has been utilized. 0
Discerning judges and scholars have long recognized, however, that
in some instances-how many is uncertain-the legislative intent is simply
not apparent. What should the responsible judge do in this situation? Judge
Albert Tate is one of the most eloquent advocates of the judicial duty
to legislate in this context" and of the judge's duty to candidly recognize
that he or she is doing just that. The Hart and Sacks materials on legal
process 2 stand as one of the leading and most thorough explorations of
the technique of judicial legislation in the face of statutory ambiguity.
As with most techniques, the exact boundaries of application are
unclear and therefore subject to manipulation. It is a small step from
actual intent, to implied intent, to constructive intent, to intentional
disregard of the apparent intent of the legislature. An example can illustrate the problem. In 1978, in response to the so-called products liability
insurance crisis, the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee enacted
the "Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978." ' Section 29-28-103 of
that Act provides a complex statute of limitations and statute of repose
for products liability suits. Putting aside questions of its constitutionality"
and scope of coverage, 5 large questions of interpretation of this section

39.

See THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED
Dainow ed. 1974); ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (J. Dainow
ed. 1969); 9 THE MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES: SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD (1917
JURISDICTIONS (J.

& reprinted 1969); Tate, Book Review, 25 LA. L. REV. 577 (1965).
40. See, e.g., Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); see also Note, The
Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution,

82 YALE L.J. 258 (1972).
41. See, e.g., Tate, The Judge's -Function and Methodology in Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.U.L. REV. 147 (1981); Tate, The Justice Function of the Judge, 1 S.U.L. REV.
250 (1975); Tate, The Law-Making Function of the Judge, 28 LA. L. REV. 211 (1968);
Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretationin Louisiana, 22 LA. L. REV. 727 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Tate, Techniques]; Tate, "Policy" in Judicial Decisions, 20 LA. L. REV. 62 (1959).
42. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958).
43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-101 to -108 (1980). Approximately two-thirds of the

states have enacted some form of restrictive products liability statute within the past six
years. See Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 602, 604
n.12 (1983); cf. La. S. Con. Res. No. 135, 5th Reg. Sess., 4 LA. HousE J. 3079 (1979).
A restrictive federal bill, S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) and S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), meeting with strong consumer opposition, has so far failed to pass in Congress.
44. Several state courts have struck down their products liability statutes as unconstitutional. See Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983), and cases cited therein.
45. The Tennessee Act applies only to suits brought "on account of personal injury,
death or property damage," and the product must either be "unreasonably dangerous"
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remain. The sharpest bite of the section is its provision that all products
actions "must be brought within ten years from the date on which the
product was first purchased for use or consumption."" A garbled exception is made for minor plaintiffs, 7 and in 1979, the General Assembly
enacted the following amendment to the section, adding another exception: "The foregoing limitation of actions
shall not apply to any action
'
resulting from exposure to asbestos." "4
What is the intent of the legislature with regard to other possible exceptions to the statute? Under the well-accepted rule of expressio unius,"
only minority and asbestos exceptions are intended. For every rule of
statutory construction, however, an equal and opposite rule usually exists.5"
Even the plain meaning of a statute may be disregarded when necessary
to effect the legislative "intent."" Surely the legislature did not intend
to cut off claims for other slowly accumulating toxic torts, such as
byssinosis, vinyl chloride poisoning and the like, which for all intents and
purposes work very much the same way as asbestosis and mesothelioma.
Moreover, no legislature could reasonably have intended to block an action based on fraudulent concealment, since to do so would shout inequity to the very heavens. And what of the continuing duty to warn, where
the duty arises each instant, thus causing the statute to begin running
anew as long as the warning is not given? Other entirely reasonable exceptions can be conjured up until the statute is eventually shot through
with exceptions, raising the spectre of constitutional arbitrariness of
classification for those cases remaining within the ten-year cutoff period
of repose, 2 Where, in all of this interpretation, does true legislative intent lie? Where does reality end and fiction begin?
or in a "defective condition," which is defined as "unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling
or consumption." TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(1)-(8) (1980). Thus, an action for purely
economic loss may not be covered by the Act. See Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture
Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982), and cases cited therein.
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (1980).
47. The statute provides that an action by a minor must be brought within either (1)
the time periods enumerated therein, or (2) one year after attaining majority, "whichever
occurs sooner." Id. Evidently, the legislature intended for the statute to run on the occurrence of the later, not the "sooner," of (1) or (2), as the federal District Court of Middle
Tennessee held in Tate v. Eli Lilly & Co., 522 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
48. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (1980).
49. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius- "expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (Rev. 5th ed. 1971).
50. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
51. Although the words of the statute may be clear and unambiguous, applying
them to the facts of the present case may produce a result so unreasonable or
so seemingly unfair as to suggest that the legislature never intended for the enactment in question to be applied to the present type of fact situation.
Tate, Techniques supra note 41, at 730.
52. See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of
Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663 (1978).
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Direct Common Law Overruling
Suppose, however, an astute legislature foresaw the problems of
statutory construction posed in the preceding section, and sought to
forestall them by a clear statement of legislative intent such as the following: "The foregoing exceptions for minority and asbestos actions are the
only exceptions intended in this provision, and no other exception shall
be made." The court is then traditionally squarely faced with the prospect of either obeying the clear legislative mandate or striking down the
statute as unconstitutional. If the court takes a conservative attitude toward
constitutional adjudication and is unwilling to strike down the statute on
constitutional grounds, it is left no other choice but that of applying the
statute as plainly written.
Professor Guido Calabresi, in his seminal work entitled A Common
Law for the Age of Statutes, 3 poses at this juncture the following provocative and profound hypothetical: "Let us suppose that common law
courts have the power to treat statutes in precisely the same way that
they treat the common law."" His entire book is built around an exploration of the implications of this supposition.
The first objection of many to whom the supposition is one of first
impression is that the exercise of such power is unconstitutional. Professor Calabresi makes short shrift of that objection." The courts have
been doing it all along by sleight of hand, through statutory interpretations, so why not do it openly? The legislature could presumably confer
this power on the courts openly, and if such conferral would be constitutional, unilateral judicial assumption of the same power would presumably
be constitutional as well. Nothing in the doctrine of separation of power'
prohibits the assumption of such power. Nothing in the constitution either
expressly allows or prohibits the assumption of such a common law adjudicatory power any more than it expressly allows or prohibits the judicial
assumption of the power to declare laws unconstitutional.
The practical ramifications of implementing such a doctrine are significant. According to Professor Calabresi, the doctrine will not necessarily
result in any greater judicial activism than already exists and need not
result in any adverse legislative backlash. The doctrine should greatly
reduce the pressure to resort unwisely to constitutional adjudication in
doubtful cases, and it should bring a large dose of honesty into the otherwise murky field of interpretational subterfuge. 6 He strongly believes that
honesty is the best policy.

53.
54.
55.
56.

G. CALABRESI, supra note 11.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 114-16.
Id. at 167-71.
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The Methodology
Professor Calabresi points out that a number of antecedents support
his proposal." His mentor, Grant Gilmore, long recognized the problem
of the glut of statutes in twentieth-century American law59 that threaten
to choke the courts' operation in the performance of their function of
common law adjudication. Gilmore predicted on the eve of his death that
a "major problem of law reform over the next half century will be the
reformulation of our theories about the allocation of power between court
and legislature." 6
Professor Calabresi's book emphasizes that statutes become inappropriate through aging, that the problem is exacerbated by the constant
passage of many new statutes, and that owing to the nature of the political
process a large number of old statutes which should be removed nevertheless tend to remain on the books. He recognizes, however, that statutes
do not become misfits simply because of age or desuetude. Statutes may
be out of synchronization when enacted, but still not so bad as to be

unconstitutional

.6

As previously noted, a major thrust of Professor Calabresi's thesis
is to achieve honesty where the courts have traditionally engaged either
in interpretational subterfuge or in unreasonable constitutional overreaction. Both traditional judicial approaches-strained interpretation and
strained determinations of unconstitutionality-are dishonest, in Professor
Calabresi's view, and therefore should be eschewed.
He recognizes the antimajoritarian thrust of his proposal, but correctly notes that it is no more so than the present function of the courts
in constitutional and interpretational adjudication-and certainly less

57.

It is well-nigh impossible to resist Wex Malone's famous incantation of "rumina-

tions" as a talisman for clear thought and an invitation to the muses' aid. See Malone,
Ruminations on Liabilityfor the Acts of Things, 42 LA. L. REV. 979 (1982); Malone, Some
Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 91; Malone, Ruminations

on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970);
Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts,
31 LA. L. REV. 1 (1970); Malone, Ruminations on Group Interests and the Law of Torts,
13 RUTGERS L. REV. 565 (1959); Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV.
60 (1956); Malone, Ruminations on a New Tort: Angelloz v. Humble Oil and Refining

Company, 4 LA. L. REV. 309 (1942).
58. G. CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 81-90.
59.
60.

G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 69 (1974).
Gilmore, What is a Law School?, 15 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982) (address at the

1982 commencement exercises of the University of Connecticut School of Law), quoted
in Calabresi, Grant Gilmore and the Golden Age, 92 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1982).

61.

G.

CALABRESI,

supra note 11, at 132.
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drastic in long-range impact than when a determination of unconstitutionality is made with regard to a statute that is possibly, although not
probably, unconstitutional.6 2 A question arises as to the basis of federal
court jurisdiction over the review of state. statutes not involving a federal
question or diversity. Professor Calabresi ingeniously notes, however, that
the question of legal propriety may raise a jurisdictional threshold constitutional issue of due process even though the law is ultimately upheld
on constitutional grounds but struck down on common law grounds.63
Presumably, the same rationale would enable state courts to similarly
review federal as well as state laws without running afoul of the supremacy
clause.
How would this proposed new method of review work in practice?
The Tennessee products liability statute of limitations, with the suggested
proviso that no other exceptions (other than minority and asbestos suits)
are to be read into this statute, 64 provides an adequate example. The court
might feel unable to honestly declare the statute unconstitutional, and only
a transparent fabrication would enable it to read an additional exception
into the statute in face of the clear proviso indicating a contrary legislative
intent. At this juncture, the court may declare that to bar a claim that
the plaintiff was unable to assert because of the defendant's fraudulent
concealment would be unreasonable and inequitable.6 ' The court could
then add a fraudulent concealment exception, prospectively or
retrospectively,6 subject. to the legislature's power of abrogating it later.
However, the legislature might not abrogate the exception, in spite of the
clear language of the proviso, because it simply may not have thought
of the inequity involved. After all, the legislature did not contemplate
when it originally enacted the statute
the inequity of barring asbestos claims
67
with only a minority exception.
For the court to strike down the ten-year limitation altogether on common law nonconstitutional grounds would, at first glance, seem much more
difficult. But to do so differs only in degree from engrafting a fraudulent
concealment exception onto the statute in the face of a clear legislative

62.
63.

Id. at 91-119.
Id. at 201-02 n.43.

64.

See supra p. 1318.

65. This is not unlike the nonconstitutional, reasonable-person approach to the invalidation of statutes long recognized at common law. See, e.g., Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610) ("[Flor when an Act of Parliament is against common right
and reason . . . the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.");
Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 2 Yer. 529, 533 (1831) ("Some acts, although not
expressly forbidden, may be against the plain and obvious dictates of reason. The common
law, says Lord Coke, (8 co. 118 a.) adjudgeth a statute so far void.").
66. For a review of the various methods of prospective overruling, see G. CALABRESI,
supra note 11, at 279-82 n.2.
67. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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intent to the contrary. The court could point to the inequity of barring
any claim before it ever arises or could reasonably be discovered, and
then point to the clear trend toward a discovery rule for statutes of
limitation. 8 It could point to the need to engraft so many exceptions onto the statute as to make it fairly arbitrary in application,69 and then suggest that if the statute is reenacted in its present form the court may need
to carefully consider the possible overtones of unconstitutionality in such
a statute. If in the face of such in terrorem tactics the legislature still
reenacts the statute, the court must do some very careful soul-searching
regarding questions of constitutionality and its role in a majoritarian
society.
Another possible use of the Calabresi doctrine, although he does not
propose it, is that of resolving factual disputes on appeal. An appellate
court will seldom revise a lower court or jury finding of primary fact,
unless the finding defies common sense, 7" but it will reverse inferential
findings, and will often do so on constitutional grounds. 7" In such cases,
a vigorously dissenting judge frequently becomes heated over the majority's usurpation of the jury function and contends that no question of
constitutional fact has been presented. In order to avoid these needless
disputes, why not simply say that the court is reviewing the facts for sufficiency in essentially the same way that common law courts regularly do?
Describing a fact review as a common law rather than a constitutional determination will not in most cases make the kind of difference
that it does for common law versus constitutional abrogation of statutes,
since fact determinations usually apply only to the immediate case and
do not have the kind of binding effect that the statutory constitutional
determination often has. Calling fact determinations common law determinations will have the salubrious effect of clearing the air, however, in
many close cases in which the majority and dissent create such a smoke
screen over the issue. Of course, there may be cases in which the fact
determination should be designated as one of constitutional magnitude
because of the gravity of the matter and the need to signal a strong and
unequivocal response thereto. The law does not tolerate physical torture
in exacting confessions, and a fact pattern indicating the use of torture
should clearly be designated unconstitutional.

68. See McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1975) (prod'
ucts liability); Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1.974) (medical malpractice), and
cases cited therein. Both of these decisions have been overruled by statute. TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-26-116, 29-28-103 (1980).
69. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
70. The majority rule is that a jury must believe uncontradicted, disinterested testimony,
Cooper, Directionsfor Directed Verdicts: A Compassfor Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REv.
903, 930-47 (1971), and cannot" disregard established physical facts.
71. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Courts may be more or less revisionist in different areas of the law
depending on a number of factors. For example, a jurisdiction such as
Louisiana, with its civil law tradition, will very likely have a stronger bias
than common law jurisdictions toward interpretation and retention rather
than revision.72 A commercial code or a tax code, with its intricate interlocking provisions and presumed unity of effect, would normally be
entitled to greater deference than isolated statutes enacted in response to
dubious crises or powerful special interest pressures.
This writer's predilection is that tort law is peculiarly suited to common law development because of its strong fact orientation, its relatively
imprecise legal standards, its tendency to accrete and absorb other areas
of the law, and its remarkable capacity to respond to changing social
needs.73 A statute regulating the law of torts, even one broadly drawn,
tends to cast this process in amber and to inhibit its vital growth. If these
observations are on the whole accurate, a substantial revisionist bias in
the tort law area should be expected,"' and courts should not be required
to overreact by using constitutional cannonade when all that is needed
is a small-bore common law rifle.
Truth and Fiction
As noted earlier, a principal reason why Professor Calabresi wants
the courts to legitimate their ability to revise and annul statutes on common law grounds, in the same way they typically treat common law precedent, is to promote honesty. Courts that pretend a constitutional issue
is involved when one is not are deceiving themselves, the public, or both.
Courts that pretend to interpret legislative intent when none exists, or
actively disregard such intent as may exist, are engaging in subterfuge.
Deception and subterfuge are bad, and honesty is always the best policy.
Lon Fuller, one of the foremost commentators on "legal fictions,"
wrote a series of brilliant law review articles by that name." Professor
Fuller is convinced that legal fictions are bad, even dangerous; he states
that they are like crutches" which should be discarded78 as soon as courts
72. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
73. In this connection, it is interesting to note that "the offenses and quasi offenses"
of the Louisiana Civil Code "have been almost totally eclipsed by the common law of
torts." Baudouin, The Impact of the Common Law on the Civilian Systems of Louisiana
and Quebec, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED
JURISDICTIONS

1, 5 (J. Dainow ed. 1974).

74.

This is certainly the approach of Professor Keeton in R.
Do JUSTICE- REFORMING PRIVATE LAW (1969).

KEETON, VENTURING TO

75. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513, 877 (1930-1931), reprinted in L.
FULLER,

76.
77.
78.

LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
L. FULLER, supra note 75, at 10.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 23.
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are able to walk on their own. And yet, in his central description of the
judicial motives for the adoption of legal fictions, he uses a metaphor
of an elderly woman choosing a dress for a ball." In another critical
passage, he repeats the philosopher Vaihinger's description of human thinking as resembling "the process of opposing mistakes which are mutually
compensatory" and the way in which "[wialking consists of a series of
falls, each arresting and compensating the other just in time."' 0 Fuller
concludes his series of articles by stating: "No theory or dogma can solve
the problem of how far we ought to generalize or 'conceptualize' [read
'fictionalize'] the law. It is a question of balance and judgment ....
Nothing will take the place . . . of a sense of tact and balance . . ."I'
Fuller seems to be guilty of the same sin which he so roundly condemns.
Surely metaphors of ballroom dresses and a person walking are not legal
verities. And "tact" and "balance" have a strange nonlegal, or at best
quasi-legal, ring to them.
The great Plato, the worshiper of pure reason, knowledge, and truth,
couches his most famous statement about knowledge in the metaphor of
the cave scene. 2 Indeed, his central concept of ideals must be pure fiction, as opposed to reality. Who has ever touched or seen an ideal? Lon
Fuller cautions against fictions because of their potential to mislead. "A
small boy," he says, "on seeing a horse for the first time, called it a
'big dog.' " But unless the boy learns the difference he "may expect the
horse to bark."' 3 Picasso saw no danger, however, in conceptualizing a
bicycle as a bull, or vice versa, "according to the needs of the mind and
the body."' 4 Prospero broke his staff, buried his book, 5 and released
Ariel not because art was bad, but because Shakespeare was simply ready
to quit writing. Perhaps the only alternative to fiction -is quitting.
Nor can any bright line be drawn between literature and law, either
in method or in purpose. When the lawyer Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg
spoke of a nation "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition
that all men are created equal," he by main force gave birth to a new
ideal that surely was fictional-in.the best sense-then, as well as now.
On a more mundane level, present lawyers daily engage in fictions with
abandon, if not joy. Who is able to tell the difference, for example, between fact and law, or fact and opinion? Or who has ever seen the
mythical reasonable person?
A major concern of Professor Calabresi-and one that has plagued
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 136-37.

82.

PLATO'S THE REPUBLIC

bk. 7, at 253 (trans. by B. Jowett n.d.).
supra note 75, at 113, 115.

83. L.

FULLER,

84. F.

GILOT & C. LUKE, LIFE WITH PICASSO 321 (1964),

85.

Id.

quoted p. 321.
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constitutional scholars since Marbury v. Madison8"6-is how to justify the
autocratic role of courts in a democratic society. To be honest and merely
admit that courts in fact exercise such power does no good. One must
also be able to say that courts should exercise that power, and why they
should. On this pivotal issue, Professor Calabresi resorts to fiction in the
grand style. He repeatedly refers to the ability of courts to discern the
"legal topography," the "legal landscape,'.' and the "legal fabric" 87 of
the law in a way that legislatures cannot do. He implies that the courts'
ability to implement their insights in this regard will bring society more
nearly in line with true democratic values than the unbridled, specialinterest, and often nonresponsive legislatures could ever do. Calabresi's
implication may be true, but it sounds more like a devout wish than a
demonstrable reality.
The big fiction in much of the discussion about judicial decisionmaking is the assumption that judges make decisions based on some kind
of objective standards-the "legal topography," if you will-and not on
their own individual values and insights. Thus, one can perpetuate the
fiction that the government is one of laws and not of men. Undoubtedly,
a judge, just as a legislator, draws on numerous sources for his decisions,88
but ultimately, the quality of the judge himself will determine the quality
of the decision.89 Otherwise, why is Marshall thought of as head and
shoulders above most of the other Supreme Court justices?
This writer has never found politicians as a group particularly
palatable, although there are occasional shining exceptions. On the other
hand, neither the state nor the federal court system is especially noted
for causing the wisest and the best to percolate to the top." If Professor
Calabresi's proposal were implemented and resulted in a substantial shift
of power in favor of the courts (as well it might), then a good deal more
careful thought and implementation should be given to the process of
judicial selection than is presently done.

86.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see, e.g., A.

THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:

(1962); J. ELY,

DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

(1980).
87. See, e.g., G. CALABRES, supra note 11, at 24, 34-35, 87, 96, 107-109, 113, 121,
129, 139, 204 n.l, 217 n.39, 242 n.31, 257 nn.40-41, 261 nn. 69 & 74.
88. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); see authorities cited
supra note 41.
89. Justice Cardozo once said: "I think we are coming more and more to a knowledge
of the truth which I have been emphasizing today that officialdom, however it displays
itself, is the husk and that what is precious is the man within." Address by Chief Judge
Cardozo, New York Court of Appeals, New York University Law School Alumni Association Luncheon (Dec. 20, 1927) 5 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1,6 (1928), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS
OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 428 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
90. See D. JACKSON, JUDGES (1974); W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? A
STUDY OF PROCEDURES FOR REMOVAL AND RETIREMENT (1971).
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Perhaps Professor Calabresi's proposal itself, if implemented, would
make better judges of those who wear the robe. Shakespeare was fond
of saying, "Assume a virtue, if you have it not," 9 but he also said just
as often that the clothes do not make the man. 9 Was he schizophrenic?
One thing is certain: his game was fiction, and not reality. Undoubtedly,
however, our society is much the richer for Shakespeare, for the Gettysburg Address, for Marbury v. Madison, 3 and for countless similar expressions of insight. By analogy, if a judge is forced to "tell it like it
is" and explain to the best of his ability just why he thinks a particular
statute (as well as common law precedent) is good or bad, then such selfexamination may indeed cause the judge to become a better person and
thus improve the commonweal. All language is metaphor, and in that
respect anything a court says is fiction; but, as Professor Calabresi so
aptly puts it, speech does have meaning.9 ' Some words come much closer
than others to mirroring personal experiences, to expressing personal feelings and insights, and to ordering society in the way society should be
ordered.
Professor Calabresi states the issue concisely when he compares
Frankfurter's balancing approach to the constitution to Hugo Black's absolutist position regarding the first amendment. "Both are actually
misleading and inaccurate," 95 he states, in the sense that both are
metaphorical ways of describing an attitude toward constitutional review.
But if Justice Black's approach results in substantially greater protection
of speech, it may come much closer to expressing society's feelings and
insights about a well-ordered society than the balancing approach does.
In that respect, Black's absolutist fiction more nearly reflects society's
conception of reality regarding the role of free speech in society than does
Frankfurter's fictional balancing scale. In the same way, a common law
judge may more nearly express society's feelings and insights about what
a court should normally be about in statutory construction by holding
statutes up to the ideals of reasonableness and fairness rather than striking them down through the myths of interpretation and constitutional
review.
W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act I11,scene IV.
92. W. SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act IV, scene IV; W. SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III
act I, scene Ill.
But cf. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act I, scene III.
93. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
94. G. CALABREsI, supra note 11, at 175; cf. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
(1946). " 'When I use a word,' " Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.' " Id. at 94. But, of course, Humpty
was a bit fragile and was unable to withstand the hard knocks of real life.
95. G. CALABRESI, supra note il, at 175.
91.

